— The Bank of Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP), run in tandem with the state-owned Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), recorded losses of GH¢22 billion (approximately US$1.9 billion) in 2025, equivalent to 1.5 per cent of gross domestic product, according to a new International Monetary Fund report .
The disclosure, contained in the Fund’s assessment accompanying the sixth and final review of Ghana’s US214 million loss the IMF first flagged in December 2025 for the nine months to end-September .
Losses Deepened as Programme Expanded
The IMF report attributed the losses to service and assay fees paid to GoldBod, discounts applied to gold sold to off-takers, and exchange rate differences between the forex bureau rate used for gold purchases and the Bank of Ghana’s official reference rate for accounting purposes . About half of the losses stemmed from buying gold at the more expensive forex-bureau exchange rate .
The gross loss on the doré gold trade with GoldBod reached the GH¢22 billion cited by the Fund before offsets from a government intervention and gains on bullion sales reduced the net hit in the central bank’s audited accounts. The IMF noted that while some losses were linked to accounting valuation effects rather than direct financial costs, they still weakened the central bank’s balance sheet .
The programme’s damage extended beyond trading losses. The IMF said the DGPP losses, coupled with higher costs of open-market operations and exchange rate valuation losses from a sharply appreciating cedi, pushed the Bank of Ghana’s equity position deeper into negative territory — to minus 6.7 per cent of GDP at the end of 2025 . The central bank and its subsidiaries recorded negative equity of GH¢93.82 billion by December 2025, up from GH¢58.62 billion in 2024 .
Waivers and Corrective Action
The gold losses had direct consequences for Ghana’s IMF programme. A government cost-sharing agreement at the end of 2025, involving the transfer of bonds with a face value of GH¢5 billion in March 2026, breached a ceiling on central bank claims on the government — a performance criterion under the loan programme — at end-December 2025 and again at end-March 2026 .
Ghanaian authorities requested, and Fund staff supported, a waiver for the missed target, which the IMF described as a minor deviation that did not reflect a weakening of the underlying policy stance .
As a corrective step and prior action for completing the review, the Bank of Ghana, GoldBod and the government signed a memorandum of understanding in July formalising the transfer of the gold programme from the central bank to GoldBod and eliminating the related quasi-fiscal activities .
Programme Transferred to GoldBod
Doré gold purchases have been conducted by GoldBod since April 1, and from July 1 the government assumed 100 per cent of the programme’s costs, replacing the central bank . GoldBod, established by an Act of Parliament in April 2025, now handles the entire chain from financing and purchasing to assaying and exporting artisanal gold, with costs to be reported transparently on the national budget .
“The Bank of Ghana shouldn’t have ventured into the gold purchase programme. It should have been left under the presidency of the Gold Board,” Sagnarigu MP Attah Issah said, arguing that the programme’s quasi-fiscal nature meant it should not have been managed by the central bank given its already fragile balance sheet .
The IMF said the change limits the central bank’s role to that of fiscal agent, removing its exposure to incremental gold-related losses. However, it cautioned that state involvement in gold buying remains a liability, noting the programme will remain a fiscal risk as long as state-led domestic gold purchases continue .
Cost Reduction Targets
Under the DGPP, the IMF said, the central bank incurred losses equal to 15.3 per cent of gross gold purchases . Authorities lowered this to 11.7 per cent in the first quarter of 2026, but the memorandum of understanding mandates a cut to 5 per cent, which the Fund said would require narrowing the forex spread, streamlining the supply chain and enhancing competition among service providers .
The IMF report disclosed that an external auditing firm is conducting a special audit of the programme from its inception, with results expected in the third quarter of 2026 .
Strategic Gains Acknowledged
Despite the financial impact, the IMF acknowledged the important role played by the DGPP in improving Ghana’s external financial position . Gold-related inflows increased significantly from US12.7 billion in 2025, including US$1.1 billion in net gains from bullion sales, largely driven by increased purchases from the artisanal and small-scale mining sector .
The Fund described the DGPP as “operationally central” to Ghana’s reserve accumulation, contributing to an eightfold increase in gross international reserves . By the end of 2025, Ghana’s reserves had risen to US1 billion in 2023 to US$10.6 billion in 2025, improving liquidity and supporting a 41 per cent nominal appreciation of the Cedi against the US dollar .
The programme also helped formalise Ghana’s artisanal mining sector, bringing into the official economy gold previously lost to smuggling — estimated at about US4 billion .
Recapitalisation Plan
The IMF also pressed for a credible plan to recapitalise the Bank of Ghana, whose balance sheet has been weakened by past monetary financing, the 2022 domestic debt restructuring and quasi-fiscal activities . Authorities have committed to full recapitalisation by 2032, to be formalised in an agreement with the finance ministry, a step the Fund called critical to restoring the central bank’s financial autonomy but one that will require a sustained fiscal effort .
