S&P Global Ratings has affirmed Ghana’s long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings at ‘B-/B’, maintaining a stable outlook, while cautioning that the country’s aggressive gold-backed reserve accumulation strategy is imposing significant fiscal costs that could strain public finances.
The US-based rating agency also affirmed its ‘B-’ transfer and convertibility assessment on Ghana. The rating action, published on September 25, 2026, leaves Ghana at the level reached after S&P upgraded the sovereign from ‘CCC+/C’ in November 2025 — a move that reflected stronger export receipts, reserve accumulation, and improved fiscal management following the 2022 debt crisis.
The ‘B-/B’ rating places Ghana in the non-investment grade (speculative or “junk”) category, indicating high credit risk and high vulnerability to default, with the assessment that adverse economic conditions would likely impair the country’s ability to repay debts.
Stable Outlook Balances Gains Against Persistent Risks
S&P said the stable outlook balances the potential for stronger balance-of-payments performance, larger foreign currency reserve buffers, and further reforms to public financial management against the still-high cost of servicing the country’s debt, sizable contingent liabilities from state-owned enterprises and the central bank, reform implementation risks, and Ghana’s rising sensitivity to terms of trade, particularly the price of gold, cocoa, and oil.
The agency noted that the expansion of Ghana’s gold sector is benefiting the country’s external metrics and that the economy is proving relatively resilient to the economic effects of the war in the Middle East. Gold exports now account for over half of export receipts and close to 10% of GDP, helping Ghana generate a record current account surplus of 7.8% of GDP (approximately US$9 billion) in 2025.
Gross foreign exchange reserves have risen markedly to US4.0 billion in 2023, and Ghana has emerged as the sixth-largest gold producer globally.
Central Bank and GoldBod Fiscal Costs Under Scrutiny
However, S&P expressed concern about the central bank’s financial position, which has been weakened by the government’s focus on rapidly accumulating foreign currency reserves via gold exports and requires significant recapitalization. The agency also warned that fiscal costs for the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) are likely to remain elevated.
The Bank of Ghana recorded an operating loss of US$1.25 billion in 2025, worsening its negative equity to 6.7% of GDP. The government has initiated a Phased Capital Restoration Programme to recapitalise the central bank through 2032, which S&P said will likely require the issuance of additional government debt.
The Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP) cost the central bank approximately GH¢9.05 billion in 2025, a figure the bank described as a cost of policy tied to the price of keeping the cedi steady. With the Bank of Ghana exiting the gold-buying programme and GoldBod assuming responsibility, the government has allocated GH¢5 billion (about US$429 million) in the revised 2026 budget to GoldBod to purchase gold from small-scale miners — moving the fiscal risk from the central bank’s balance sheet onto the national budget.
S&P estimates the fiscal cost of the reserve accumulation strategy could range between 0.8% and 2.6% of annual GDP. The agency said it anticipates Ghana’s public debt service capacity will increasingly depend on how well the government manages the fiscal costs and contingent liabilities stemming from the rapid expansion of the gold sector.
IMF Policy Coordination Instrument Anchors Reform Agenda
S&P expects economic reforms to progress, supported by the International Monetary Fund’s new 36-month, unfunded Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI). Ghana successfully concluded its US371 million.
The PCI is a non-financing arrangement designed to help Ghana maintain fiscal discipline while supporting growth, preserve debt sustainability, strengthen fiscal transparency and governance, and support economic diversification. The IMF has outlined 10 priority reforms for Ghana’s post-bailout era, including strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation, protecting the independence of the Bank of Ghana, completing the transfer of the domestic gold purchase programme to GoldBod, and recapitalising the central bank by 2032.
Debt Restructuring Nears Completion
Ghana has nearly completed a comprehensive restructuring of its debt. The government completed the exchange of the outstanding SADEREA Notes on July 13, 2026, resolving the last outstanding component of its sovereign bonded debt restructuring and bringing the external debt restructuring process to a conclusion.
S&P noted that Ghana has reached agreements in principle covering about 97% of the debt included in the restructuring programme. The agency warned, however, that although not part of its base case, it could lower the rating if the debt restructuring process were to stall — a scenario that could occur if Ghana’s creditors disagree on comparability-of-treatment principles and the terms they receive under the G20 Common Framework restructuring process.
Ghana’s public debt stood at GH¢733.9 billion as of July 2026, equivalent to 45.9% of GDP, according to Bank of Ghana data. The ratio is far below crisis-era levels but remains a significant burden.
12-Year Rating Trajectory: From Default to Stability
The affirmation caps a remarkable turnaround in Ghana’s credit standing. In December 2022, Ghana defaulted on its external debt, and by early 2023 its sovereign rating had been downgraded to ‘SD’ (Selective Default) by S&P. The country subsequently launched a comprehensive debt restructuring encompassing domestic bonds, Eurobonds, and official creditor claims.
In November 2025, S&P upgraded Ghana’s rating from ‘CCC+/C’ to ‘B-/B’ — a three-notch improvement — citing rising export volumes, favourable prices for gold and cocoa, and improved fiscal discipline. The upgrade came after Ghana completed the exchange of US$13.1 billion in Eurobonds in October 2024 and made further progress on restructuring remaining debt.
Moody’s also upgraded Ghana from Caa2 to Caa1 in October 2025. The successive upgrades marked Ghana’s rehabilitation in international credit markets after the 2022 default, which forced the suspension of Eurobond payments worth US$13.1 billion.
The IMF reclassified Ghana from “high risk” to “moderate risk” of debt distress in July 2026, reflecting the marked improvement in debt sustainability indicators. The Fund noted that all debt indicators are now below their thresholds, reflecting fiscal consolidation, stronger-than-expected growth, and a more appreciated exchange rate path.
Downside and Upside Scenarios
S&P said it could lower Ghana’s ratings over the next 12 to 18 months if the government’s ability to refinance maturing debt comes under strain from rising deficits due to fiscal slippage or worsening performance at the Bank of Ghana or state-owned entities such as GoldBod, or from materially higher-than-forecast public debt or debt service costs.
The agency also warned of a downgrade if terms of trade or export volumes deteriorate, causing Ghana’s external financing needs and external indebtedness to increase.
On the upside, S&P said it could raise the rating if Ghana maintains low fiscal deficits and reduces debt and debt service costs, strengthening its access to foreign financing. An upgrade would also depend on Ghana continuing to strengthen its external position, including through the accumulation of additional foreign currency reserves.
Economic Resilience Amid External Headwinds
Ghana’s economy has demonstrated relative resilience to the economic effects of the Middle East war, although rising input costs — largely linked to higher fuel and transport prices — are starting to have an impact. Inflation fell from a peak of 54.1% in December 2022 to 5% in August 2026, enabling the Bank of Ghana to cut its policy rate to 14%. Real GDP growth reached 6.0% in 2025, up from 5.8% in 2024.
The World Bank has noted, however, that primary surpluses achieved through capital expenditure under-execution are fragile and growth-constraining. Continued compression of public investment precisely when the Big Push infrastructure programme calls for its expansion creates a policy tension between Ghana’s fiscal arithmetic and its development ambitions.
As Ghana transitions from an IMF-supported programme to a non-financing Policy Coordination Instrument, the focus will shift to sustaining reform momentum and building resilience beyond the crisis era. The coming years will test whether the country can convert its hard-won fiscal gains into durable economic transformation — or whether the fiscal cost of protecting those gains will prove too high.
