The financial losses recorded by the newly-established Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) should not be viewed in isolation but rather as a strategic price paid to dislodge entrenched foreign buyers from the country’s lucrative small-scale mining sector, Dr. Emmanuel Steve Asare Manteaw, Co-Chair of the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI), has stated.
Dr. Manteaw’s comments come amid growing public scrutiny over GoldBod’s financial performance since its inception. The state agency, tasked with regulating and purchasing gold from small-scale miners, has reported significant operational losses, sparking debates about its efficiency and viability.
However, the policy analyst argues that the losses are an inevitable consequence of GoldBod’s entry into a market long dominated by powerful international buyers with deep pockets and established relationships with local miners.
The Competitive Landscape GoldBod Faced
According to Dr. Manteaw, when GoldBod was established, it did not enter a vacuum but rather a fiercely competitive market where foreign buyers had already cemented their positions through financial incentives and material support.
“The Indians were providing money, the Chinese were providing equipment, the Turkish—they were all providing resources for Ghanaian miners in exchange for the gold,” Dr. Manteaw explained during an interview.
These foreign operators had built years of trust and commercial relationships with artisanal and small-scale miners across the country. They offered not just a market for gold but also essential inputs—capital for mining operations, machinery, and logistical support—that local miners desperately needed.
“Now, you set up a gold board, and you want the gold board to win the market. How did they do that?” he asked rhetorically, highlighting the uphill battle GoldBod faced from its inception.
The Price Premium Strategy
Dr. Manteaw noted that GoldBod, unlike its foreign competitors, had not offered any supplementary support services to miners. Without the ability to provide equipment or working capital, the state agency’s only competitive lever was pricing.
“The only way they can do that is to ensure that they offer a better price,” he said.
However, offering premium prices came at a significant cost. While foreign buyers were purchasing Ghanaian gold at a discount—often leveraging their access to cheaper capital and established supply chains—GoldBod was compelled to buy at prevailing market rates.
Crucially, Dr. Manteaw revealed that GoldBod was using the forex bureau rate, which is substantially higher than the Bank of Ghana’s official rate, further inflating the agency’s purchasing costs.
“And so you find that there is a certain uncovered cost in the transactions, but it was necessary for them to win the Ghanaian miners and to get them to sell to Gold Board,” he explained.
This pricing strategy, while costly, was essential to breaking the stranglehold of foreign buyers and redirecting Ghana’s gold production toward state-controlled channels.
Historical Precedent for Losses
Dr. Manteaw also pushed back against the narrative that GoldBod’s financial performance represents an unprecedented failure, pointing to historical data showing that Ghana has consistently recorded losses from its gold purchasing programmes in recent years.
“We make it look like this is the first time Ghana is making losses in its gold purchase program,” he said. “I’ve looked at the data. 2022, we made a loss. In 2023, 2024, and 2025, we’ve made losses all those years. Why didn’t that become a problem?”
He cited 2024 as a particularly stark example, revealing that Ghana recorded a combined loss of ¢5.7 billion from two key initiatives: the Gold for Oil programme and domestic gold purchases for reserves. The breakdown, according to Dr. Manteaw, showed losses of $1.8 billion from Gold for Oil and $3.8 billion from domestic gold-for-reserves purchases.
The Broader Economic Calculus
Rather than focusing solely on the headline loss figures, Dr. Manteaw urged a more nuanced assessment that weighs the costs against the wider economic dividends.
“You need to look at the relativity. How much did you spend to bring in what, and what has been the impact?” he asked.
He argued that the economy-wide benefits of GoldBod’s operations—and similar state-led gold purchasing programmes—far outweigh the direct financial costs. Key among these benefits is improved foreign exchange stability, which enables businesses to plan effectively and reduces uncertainty in the broader economy.
“Your imports have gone down—I mean, in terms of cost of your imports, have gone down,” he noted, referring to the dampening effect of a more stable cedi on import costs.
Additionally, Dr. Manteaw pointed to the potential for lower inflation and interest rates, both of which would create a more conducive environment for private sector investment and economic growth.
“Oh yes. You have forex stability, so a business can plan properly. Now, again, you have low inflation, you have low interest rates, and all these get to establish the foundation for economic growth,” he added.
A Strategic Mandate
Dr. Manteaw concluded by calling for a more contextualized understanding of GoldBod’s financial challenges. The agency, he emphasized, was not simply a commercial enterprise but a strategic instrument of state policy, tasked with reclaiming Ghana’s gold trade from foreign interests and strengthening the country’s foreign exchange reserves.
“So, we need to actually just situate the conversation within the context in which Gold Board found itself when it was given the mandate to regulate gold trade,” he said.
The debate over GoldBod’s losses is ultimately a debate about the cost of economic sovereignty—whether Ghana can afford to pay a premium to reclaim control over its most valuable natural resource, and whether the long-term benefits justify the short-term financial pain.
